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Summary. This paper traces the development of policies dealing with
HIV/AIDS in Botswana from their beginning in the late 1980s to the current
programme to provide population-wide anti-retroviral therapy (ARV). Using
a variety of source material, including long-term ethnographic research, it
seeks to account for the failure of Western-inspired approaches in dealing
with the pandemic. It does this by looking at the cultural and institutional
features that have created resistance to the message and inhibited eﬀective
implementation. The negative response to the first educational campaign
stressing condom use is described and contextualized in terms of Tswana
ideas of morality and illness. Nor, as was initially expected, did the
introduction of free ARV therapy operate to break the silence and stigma
that had developed around the disease. Take-up was very slow, and did not
operate to encourage widespread testing. In 2003, key policymakers in
Botswana began to argue for a break with the AIDS ‘exceptionalism’
position, with its emphasis on voluntarism, confidentiality and the human
rights of patients. This resulted in routine testing being introduced in 2004.
This links to a major argument running through the paper which is that the
failure of policy cannot be attributed solely to the nature of local popula-
tions. Western cultural assumptions about ‘good practice’ also require critical
examination.
Introduction
The 21st century begins as the newest plague in world history aﬀects millions in
Africa and threatens equal devastation across many of the poorest regions of other
continents. This is occurring in a situation where medical knowledge of the disease is
extremely sophisticated and where even if there is no vaccine or cure, there are
palliative measures both to prevent infection and to prolong life. Supporting this,
there is a panoply of international, indeed global agencies, whose mandate is public
health. There is much talk, much money pledged and indeed spent in the ‘war against
AIDS’. UNAIDS was formed to co-ordinate policy in 1995 and the Global Fund to
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combat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria was launched in 2002. New initiatives seem to
be announced almost monthly, usually with considerable fanfare. In quick succession,
since then, there have been the World Bank’s Multicountry AIDS Program (MAP),
President Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and the Clinton initiative. There
remains, however, a searing gap between intention and result, for those measures that
have been advocated in Africa have, in the main, been signally ineﬀective. And, it is
only now, 20 years into the pandemic, that the reasons for such failure can be sought,
not in the particular diﬃculties of Africa or in the apparent resistance of its
population to take on board the safe-sex message. At long last, a few voices are
beginning to question the nature of Western intervention and its ideological
underpinnings.
Alex de Waal in 2003 writes ‘the AIDS industry is a prisoner of political
circumstance, and as a result, may be trapped in a cycle of ineﬀectiveness’ (de Waal,
2003, p. 255). He argues that there is an un-theorized consensus on what an
HIV/AIDS programme should look like. This consensus emerged from the contests
between diﬀerent interest groups in the USA in the 1980s. These, as Epstein (1996)
has documented, drew their legitimacy from many sources, most particularly
medicine, public health and AIDS activism on the part of gay men. Confidentiality
was to be at the fore to protect the infected from the dangers of stigma and
discrimination. This created a policy where the stress was to be on voluntary
behaviour change and condom use advocated as a general population directive.
Reinforcing this was growing international NGO concern with issues of human rights,
taking a particular focus here with regard to HIV, with the rights of victims of the
disease held paramount.
In retrospect, and with particular reference to Africa, this all seems very strange.
Little money, for example, was pledged to the development of medical infrastructures
in the 1980s or 1990s, despite the fact that in many African countries these had
deteriorated under the impact of the structural adjustment policies. Instead, a
dangerously infectious disease was combated only by programmes that urged
individuals to try and avoid it as best they could in a situation where there was no
means of knowing who was infected and who was not and, in the main, no way of
finding out.
Only now, 20 years into the pandemic, are some looking outside the tunnel vision
that this policy consensus has induced. Working from Nairobi, De Cock et al., in
2002 (p. 67), argue that ‘human rights approaches to the HIV/AIDS prevention might
have reduced the role of public health and social justice’. They put forward a cogent
argument for the acceptance of measures used for other infectious diseases – including
sexually transmitted ones – such as widespread testing, partner notification, and the
tracing of contacts. The significance of this move can be illustrated by the fact that
even now in Africa only 6% of the population who want voluntary testing have access
to it, and only 14% of people in need of STD services can obtain them (Global HIV
Prevention Group, 2003). Testing facilities simply do not exist over much of Africa.
The response to SARS has in many respects given impetus to this new mood. The
SARS epidemic in 2003 demonstrated the ability of global organizations to act
rapidly to eradicate the threat of this new disease. There, the danger to public health
was the only issue: there was no talk of the danger of quarantining to human liberty.
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Of course, there are huge diﬀerences in the nature of the diseases in question, in their
manner of transmission and in their duration. The one brought evident signs of
infection soon after contact; the other operates with a delayed fuse, manifesting
symptoms often years after infection and infecting the next generation in the process.
Yet, the argument of this paper is that it is not the epidemiology of the disease that
is at issue but the specific model of prevention that has been exported by the West
and which has dominated programmes in Africa. In this model, normal public health
measures have not been to the fore: routine testing and quarantining have (with a few
notable exceptions) not been the instruments of choice.
A return will be made to this topic. First, in the time-honoured anthropological
way, the argument is pursued through a case study. Through the examination of
policies in Botswana, the intention is to illustrate the hold of the consensus and the
way it has dictated particularly policy programmes and initiatives. The current paper
is based upon research over a two-year period (1997–1999) while lecturing at the
University of Botswana. This was followed by a short return fieldtrip with Alinah
Segobye and Tim Allen in July 2003, under the auspices of ACHAP (African
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership). Policymakers in the capital and those
involved in running the anti-retroviral therapy (ARV) programme were interviewed as
well as village leaders in the countryside. The study of the ARV programme was
further facilitated by the robust evaluations of the main policymakers and managers,
and the wide reporting of these in newspapers and web sources. Finally, the work was
facilitated by the researcher’s long-term involvement in Africa, with ethnographic field
research stretching back over 30 years.
HIV/AIDS and anthropological research
Anthropologists, it should be said, have not been enlisted into the eﬀort to combat
HIV/AIDS in Botswana, nor have they achieved an established position elsewhere.
Indeed, it would be true to say that anthropology stands outside the coalition of
interests represented by those involved in HIV prevention and treatment, the local
knowledge of its practitioners and their potential insights having been neglected
(Heald, 2003). Thus, even when the calls of the international community emphasize
the importance of adapting policy to local cultural understandings and conditions,
this has not involved the use of anthropological forms of understanding. On the
sidelines, then, anthropology’s contribution to the research on HIV/AIDS may be said
to be largely a critical one, pointing to the gaps in the policy, its lack of local
responsiveness, and its neglect of important social and political contexts that create
populations vulnerable to the disease. The work of Farmer (1992, 1999), Manderson
& Whiteford (2000), Seidel (2003) and Waterston (1997), as well as many others,
point to the dearth of social and political analysis that has been associated with
individualistic intervention strategies.
The reasons for the neglect of anthropology are complex but some can be sought
in the rise of consultancy social research, with its emphasis on short-term method-
ologies, such as KAP (knowledge, attitudes, practices) surveys, which are seen to yield
immediate results. These snap-shot pictures rarely yield clues as to why – as so
often – there is disparity between apparent ‘knowledge’ and ‘practice’. They provide
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a picture without the context needed to interpret it. Focus groups may then be utilized
to gain some insight but, again, such methods depend on setting up an artificial
situation, divorced from the real-life settings in which attitudes and practices emerge.
Anthropological research, by contrast, is all about context. It is also long-term; the
researcher gaining a deep understanding of the society in question through participant
observation in natural settings, supplemented by in-depth interviewing of key inform-
ants and by documentary, archival and other bibliographic searches. Its findings relate
not just to the statements of individuals surveyed but to the cultural setting in which
they have meaning and to the political and economic contexts in which lives are lived.
The built-in assumption in most AIDS awareness campaigns that ‘knowledge’ will
dispel ‘ignorance’ ignores the fact that knowledge exists at many diﬀerent levels, and
is contextualized diﬀerently. What one ‘knows’ in one place or time – in a school
classroom or an NGO-run seminar – may have little relevance outside of this context,
where other ‘knowledges’ and incentives come into their own and are more
compelling.
Botswana is an interesting case to focus on here because its programmes to
combat HIV/AIDS have from the beginning, in the late 1980s, taken their lead from
international ‘expert’ advice. Initially, they were orientated to behaviour change with
the condom a key element in the message. Then, in 2001, there was a major shift in
policy, with Botswana becoming the first African country to introduce free ARV
treatment to its population. In both initiatives, one could say that it was and is ahead
of the game, with an eﬀective state willing to recognize the problem of HIV and use
its resources in attempts to tackle it. The problems that it has faced are thus
instructive and speak to the limitations of Western-based assumptions and ideas of
‘good practice’.
Botswana phase one: behaviour change and the condom
Botswana is an unusual African state and, in the era of AIDS, one largely immune
from the problems that have perplexed so many other countries of sub-Saharan
Africa. Firstly, it is politically stable; there have been no major wars, and the country
is justly proud of its constitutional democracy. Further, its wealth has protecting it
from the eﬀects of economic liberalization and the structural adjustment policies
imposed by the World Bank and IMF elsewhere. In African terms, with an estimated
GNP per capita of almost US$4000 in 1999, it is rich. This wealth is largely due to
diamond mining and, with income exceeding expenditure, the government built up
substantial reserves throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This was not at the expense of
public investment and welfare programmes. Political leadership in the country was
committed to the rapid modernization and development of its admittedly small
population, estimated in 2004 as 1·7 million. Educational provision was extended,
with universal primary and secondary education and the development of a tertiary
sector. Importantly, too, hospitals and clinics were developed and there was
approximately one health facility per 2500 persons in 1995 (USAID, 1996).
Botswana also realized the problem of AIDS early in southern African terms, a
good ten years before its neighbour, South Africa. At that time, it brought in the
international agencies for advice and in 1987 set up a one-year emergency plan that
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has been followed by a series of other five-year strategic plans. Programmes were
developed aimed both at surveillance and intervention. These were all phrased in
terms of the accepted formulations of the international organizations as multi-
sectoral, integrated and so on. Reading the plans one cannot but be impressed. The
reality has been diﬀerent.
Initially, one might have supposed that if Western AIDS policies were capable of
working anywhere in Africa they should have worked here; that is, in a country with
an eﬀective government, small population and modern sector health provision.
However, the numbers infected doubled in the five years after 1992, when the first
sentinel survey was conducted. In 1997 Botswana became known as the AIDS capital
of the world. Nor do more recent figures give grounds for much optimism. The
nationwide medians of women tested anonymously at antenatal clinics express the
situation well. They show an escalating rate in the early 1990s, then a possible
levelling oﬀ of prevalence, with percentages rising only from 32·4% to 38·5% in the
six years from 1995 to 2000 for 15–45-year-old women (Clarion, 2002, p. 4). However,
since such a levelling might be due to the toll of death and infertility among women
of that age group due to HIV infection, it gives little cause for optimism. The median
prevalence among 15–19-year-olds tends to a more pessimistic interpretation, with
26·7% infected in the 2000 survey. Though estimates vary, life expectancy is projected
to fall from 67 years to as low as 33 years before bottoming out.
The first phase of HIV/AIDS policy was to provide surveillance and education. A
mass education campaign was launched in 1988 with the condom the central plank
in this message. What this encountered initially was widespread disbelief (Ingstad,
1990; Ubomba-Jaswa, 1993). For the population at large, at this point, there was
simply no evidence in the form of morbidity or mortality to support the information
on the impending epidemic. Botswana expressed this by calling AIDS the ‘radio
disease’ as the radio had been the prime and, for many, the only knowledge they had
of this new threat (Ingstad, 1990). By 1995/6, the situation had changed in that many
now had direct experience of it in the deaths of family and friends. People continued
to call it the radio disease. Indeed, though ‘knowledge’ of the disease was probably
good in the major urban areas, in the sense that people had heard of it, this did not
necessarily hold in the rural villages.
Further, to initial disbelief was added an element of outrage. The promotion of
barrier methods to prevent infection set up the cry of immorality, of encouraging
promiscuity. As such, it met the resistance of churches, parents and population. This
disbelief of the facts and the opposition in terms of morality fed in and fuelled an
alternative discourse of AIDS, which grew out of Tswana beliefs and understanding
(Heald, 2002). In this discourse AIDS is not seen as a new disease but as an old one,
a manifestation of old ‘Tswana’ ailments, grown more virulent in response to the
disregard for the mores of traditional culture. At the level of experience, this is all too
comprehensible. AIDS manifests itself not as a new disease but as a mass of old ones.
The association of AIDS here is not with disease per se but with pollution, consequent
upon the breaking of prohibitions which ideally control reproductive life. These
proscribe sexual contact at various times, most particularly during menstruation,
following birth or miscarriage and after death. This is based on an elaborate and
coherent bio-moral theory. In this, sexual intercourse has an especial value, not just
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because of its procreative power, but because it creates connection, a flow of bloods,
between legitimate sexual partners. This is deemed health-giving in itself. A corollary
of this is that the condom could be seen as designed not to prevent infection but as
an agent in its origin and spread. In stopping such flows, it was interpreted by
traditional doctors and the leaders of spirit churches as a vector of ill-health and
disease (Heald, 2002).
Further, it is worth remembering that this population, like most in Africa, value
procreation. The condom message was initially developed for a population that
practised recreational and not procreational sex. Few of those involved in the
educational eﬀort seem to have stepped back to ask whether the universal
condom-use message was equally appropriate in these other very diﬀerent circum-
stances. It is relevant to note that around half of female students at the University
of Botswana had children and that this was not an aberration. Over the years of male
labour migration to South Africa, the age of marriage had been delayed, and having
children was seen as a step on the road to marriage: a proof of fertility rather than
something that should only happen afterwards.
The educational campaign ran into problems partly because it was culturally
inappropriate. More than that, it operated to highlight the fact that this population
was far from homogenous. The very rapidity of modernization in the twenty years
since the development of mining had led to huge disparities in wealth, education and
opportunity. There were many eﬀectively disenfranchized by Botswana’s economic
miracle with 50% of households estimated to live at or below the poverty line
(Botswana, 1996). Many of these households were those headed by the old, who had
had no access to modern education, and who found their values and assumptions
over-ridden and ignored by the new arbiters of truth. The old truths survived,
possibly becoming even more firmly articulated in opposition (Heald, 2002). It is
important to note that, in contrast to surrounding countries, traditional doctors,
churchmen and local communities were not incorporated in the educational eﬀort.
It was exclusively in the hands of oﬃcial channels and thus to a large extent seen
as ‘external’ and ‘white’ (sekgoa as opposed to setswana). In eﬀect, one had two
parallel discourses operating in the 1990s: discourses that were not allowed to meet.
There simply were no forums in which they could be debated, contested or even
discussed. One was government endorsed and public, making the second appear
as unoﬃcial and sub rosa, though for many it was these truths that appeared
self-evident. This polarization took and takes many forms, but of greatest relevance
here is that modernity, and indeed the modern state, was increasingly associated
with sexual laxity and disease, an aﬀront to Tswana morality and ideas of
causation.
If this was one major problem, there were also others. It was apparent that the
government-sponsored campaign was not pursued with any great vigour in the 1990s.
After the initial campaigns, the issue seemed to sink into a silence that was to dog
later eﬀorts to mobilize the population. There were throughout problems with
disseminating the information, of staﬀ shortages and the lack of good leaflets for
distribution through the health posts (USAID, 1996). When all the major donors
pulled out after 1995, on the grounds that the relative wealth of Botswana allowed
it to underwrite its own programmes, the dearth of information became increasingly
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evident. One conclusion to be drawn is that there was a lack of political will. This
invites speculation as to the perverse economic incentives operating in Botswana,
where the demographic implications of the epidemic were not matched by equally
dismal economic forecasts (see Allen & Heald, 2004). Unlike agricultural-based
economies, which dominate throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, the wealth of
Botswana relies largely on a diamond industry employing a small number of workers.
Population collapse would not necessarily spell economic collapse. In any event, while
dire forecasts were being produced of the demographic time bomb, on how the death
rate would produce growing dependency ratios, there was, in the absence of
procedures for recording deaths, little direct evidence of rising mortality until the
mid-to-late nineties.
The silence around the topic is often put down to the strength of stigma. This was
certainly real enough, with only seven people – as it was said – having ‘come out’ as
HIV-positive by 1999. University students who were aware of the figures took a
fatalistic if, in some ways, rational view. Believing their chances of being positive were
very high, they had little incentive to go for testing and risk the stigmatization of
living with the disease. Nor did they have any incentive to change their sexual
behaviour: ‘What was the point?’ they said in conversation. They talked of all dying
together, of not wanting to live without their friends, and so on.
Botswana phase two: the ARV programme
If the first phase of Botswana’s ‘war against AIDS’ was marked as much by inaction
as action, things were to change dramatically in the second phase with the programme
to roll out anti-retroviral therapy (ARV). Treatment was fore-grounded by activist
groups and endorsed by the WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative aiming to provide ARV therapy
to 3 million people in the developing world by the end of 2005. In 2001, Botswana
became the first country in Africa to pioneer this on a nationwide basis. Anti-
retroviral therapy treatment, it was proposed, would operate not only as a
humanitarian intervention but advance behaviour change by breaking the cycle of
denial, infection and death, as it was put. The government put its whole weight and
considerable resources behind the initiative.
A key date for this change in HIV/AIDS policy was mid-term transfer of power
from President Masire to President Mogae in April 1997, though it was not until
August 1999 that Mogae launched a new campaign against HIV. He went on to enlist
a number of overseas partners and, in 2001, established a public/private partnership
with Merck Pharmaceuticals and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, known as
the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP). The aim, as had been
said, was not simply humanitarian: that is to provide relief to the aﬄicted and
prolong life. More significantly, its overall aim was to provide therapy in order to
encourage testing, and a new openness towards the disease.
The title Masa (New Dawn) expressed the initial optimism for the programme,
with its aim that by the end of 2002, a little under one-fifth of the 110,000 people
whom it was believed could benefit (those with a CD4 count of 200 or less) would
be on treatment. However, in the event, the roll-out was much slower. Firstly,
although Botswana’s health care sector was well developed in African terms, it did
HIV/AIDS policy in Botswana 7
not have the testing facilities, nor the staﬀ to supply ARVs on this scale. The decision
was made to deliver the therapy through special dedicated sites, in order to monitor
compliance, toxicity and resistance in this experimental programme. Thirty-two
operating sites were planned, but only two centres were operational by end of 2002
and four by April of 2003. At that time, two years after the inception of the
programme, only 4643 people were on ARV. The initial target of 19,000 was not to
be reached for another year, until April 2004 (Darkoh, 2004).
The problem of infrastructure was real enough but so too was the reluctance to
test. The programme initially seems to have little eﬀect on the silence and stigma. The
number of those who had ‘come out’ and gone public with the fact that they were
infected had gone up only to twelve, it was said by ACHAP personnel, in 2003 when
the ARV programme was in full swing. Further, those who did come forward for
treatment were mostly those in the latter stage of the disease, with CD4 counts so low
that therapy was diﬃcult and mortality high. The inrush of such patients, in turn,
created bottlenecks, slowing the admission into the programme of those who could
more easily be treated (Darkoh, 2004).
When interviewed in July 2003, Donald de Korte, the Director of ACHAP, spoke
of a general inertia. High hopes, he said, were running on the scheme as a pioneering
model for the whole of southern Africa but, at the moment, all the managers could
see were the snags. One source of stagnation was the bureaucracy itself. Donors had
flooded in with the ARV programme with the result that Botswana had become a
land of acronyms, with a mosaic of programmes and agencies criss-crossing one
another. Much of the overarching structure had been established in line with
directives from World Bank and UNAIDS, with the establishment of an independent
National AIDS Council and a National AIDS Coordinating Agency. This later was
mandated to co-ordinate all initiatives but often, in eﬀect, replicated existing
structures. As elsewhere, (Putzel, 2004), the immediate eﬀect of this was to create turf
wars between diﬀerent agencies, and diﬀerent ministries in the government. Further,
the many new initiatives were all jumping to meet much the same demands, and all
competing for personnel inside their areas of operation. Botswana is a small country
with limited trained staﬀ. This, and the stifling eﬀect of bureaucratic regulation,
inevitably perhaps had the eﬀect of slowing down the implementation of ambitious
programmes.
Then, there was the issue of cost. At the outset, to treat 110,000 people as
originally envisaged, Botswana needed a 30% increase in doctors, an almost 200%
increase in pharmacists, and so on (Clarion, 2002, p. 11). The cost of ARV therapy
per patient per year was put at approximate £750 in 2003. In addition, Botswana
experienced what we might call the downside of philanthropy. The mere presence of
international organizations immediately raised costs for the government. Salaries in
international agencies were 3–10 times higher than in government service. So, the lack
of trained personnel was aggravated by transfers out of government health provision.
It is important to note that the government remains responsible for most of the health
provision in the country. This is true even in the ARV sector, with Botswana funding
at least 70% of the bill in the current private–public partnerships. Further, outside
resources are pledged only for five years, the idea being that Botswana would then
pick up the full cost (AllAfrica, 2003).
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Given the expense, it is diﬃcult to estimate how long the country can continue
with the programme, let alone export it elsewhere, as originally envisaged. The issue
of sustainability is increasingly addressed. A year after his 2003 Washington address,
President Mogae had this message for his people: ‘abstain from unsafe sex or die’
(BBC News, 2004b). With 30,000 people now enrolled in the programme, he had to
explain that it could not be continued in the long term unless infection rates were
dramatically brought down.
The overall problems with the ARV programme are evident and large enough.
Nevertheless, it is important to address the issue of whether it was having any impact
on local opinion, or whether the new political determination to increase awareness of
the disease and to test was having an eﬀect on attitudes at the village level. In July
2003, interviews were conducted with oﬃcials in several villages in a rural area of
eastern Botswana. The question was whether there was evidence of the ‘community
mobilization’ advocated in policy directives.
Botswana has a ready-made institution at all levels for the formation and
promulgation of policy. During the colonial era, the administration had developed
around the kingdoms and their internal hierarchy of chiefs and councils. These
continue to exist at all levels from the sub-ward up to the ward, village, tribe and
thence to the House of Chiefs. Existing in parallel to the bureaucracy of the modern
post-colonial state, however, they have been increasingly marginalized. Thus, though
the hereditary chiefs and headmen (dikgosi) still sit every day in their councils/courts
(dikgotla) and are paid a stipend by the government, they have little of the executive
power that they had once possessed. Nevertheless, from the point of view of most of
rural Botswana, they still represent a significant authority and the one most
immediate and easily comprehended (Helle-Valle, 2002). The kgotla, usually a circular
area, sometimes marked solely by stones, but more usually by elaborately decorated
shelters, is still treated almost as sacred space, where the old rules of respect apply.
It is also in a sense ‘privileged’ space as, in principle, it is an arena of free speech,
where issues can be discussed openly and where the chief may not only issue directives
but be subject to criticism and advice by his subjects. In the past, the arena was a
male forum, and this is still largely the case although women may now attend.
However, the erosion of the power of the chief means that they deal at lower levels
with minor dispute settlement and even here government courts run in parallel.
Here again, one finds the schism between modernity and tradition – between the
modern government apparatus, with its democratic constitution and bureaucratic
forms, and the older customary one, again designated in terms of the opposition
between Sekgoa (white) and Setswana (Tswana). Today, the kgotla continues much
of its work of government at village level through a range of elected village
committees – for development, health, AIDS – who report to kgotla but also to
oﬃcial committees and government oﬃces further up the hierarchy. The chiefs are to
an extent sidelined by such a structure and share a common narrative of disem-
powerment. For example, among those interviewed, none cited AIDS initially as a
major village problem. The response to further questioning was to say that it was an
external problem, with people coming back from the towns to die. HIV was not, they
maintained, in their village. When pressed on questions about controlling sexuality in
the village, the standard response was that there was still disbelief; the youth take no
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notice – for them it is still the ‘radio disease’. Moreover, the youth were beyond
control. With the increasing mobility of the population, many of the old sanctions are
diﬃcult to apply. Fining a man for making a girl pregnant can in many cases be
enforced when both live in the same or neighbouring villages, but is much more
diﬃcult when their home villages are distant or one is from an urban area. Further,
they argued that if they tried to intervene, for example by trying to discipline a young
man for seduction, they risked having human rights lawyers on their backs. This
emphasizes the way the two discourses of HIV and human rights have developed
tightly in tandem, with the latter powerful enough to be felt even in fairly remote
rural areas of Botswana.
As a counter to this, we did hear of chiefs acting in spheres where they still could.
Significantly, this was about the cost of burials for, as the death toll has risen, so too
has the cost of death. Twenty-four hour funeral parlours are now a prominent feature
of any large township, and the family is expected to provide an elaborate casket and
feed mourners at vigils held for the dead in the days before the internment, and after
the funeral. Some chiefs, though not in the villages visited, had outlawed vigils to
relieve the families of this burden. One village visited, on the initiative of the chief’s
wife, had set up a village-wide burial society to club together to build their own
mortuary. In other areas, the ability to act on a collective basis, without finance and
authorization from above, was clearly very, very limited.
Far from community mobilization at village level, the situation reinforced the
message of silence. Up-country, there were a few posters, mainly at bus shelters, and
fewer billboards. There were none at all at the village level, either in public places or
in the oﬃces visited. Nor was it possible for chiefs to put up their own posters
without authorization from the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA).
Knowledge could come down – through occasional seminars run by out-reach
personnel – but never go up. Paradoxically perhaps, the very legitimacy now given to
democratic forms of government created its own blockages. For example, the
committees that determined policy only sat when sitting allowances were authorized.
This was true all the way up the hierarchy, and applied equally to village, district and
national committees. Thus, sittings were infrequent due to the expense, causing delays
in the information and decision-making chain. And ultimately, permission for any
AIDS-related activity had to be sanctioned by NACA.
The problem of paper policies that, given the political circumstances and
dominating understandings, have little real eﬀect is one that has plagued the issue of
AIDS from the beginning. Grand policy initiatives developed by AIDS experts and
woven, formulaically, into national programmes have proved, even in a country such
as Botswana with significant governmental capacity, diﬃcult to implement. Never-
theless, the ARV programme in Botswana was, while conforming in part to this usual
dismal story, to eventually challenge consensus thinking. Key agency players in 2003
began to be strongly in favour of breaking with the AIDS ‘exceptionalism’ position,
as the view that HIV/AIDS has to be treated diﬀerently from other infectious diseases
has come to be known.
In June 2003, a seminar was called in Gaborone to discuss the current procedures
with regard to testing. Kwame Ampomah, the UNAIDS coordinator, denounced the
current testing policy for failing the objectives of public health. In arguing for the
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need to ‘normalize’ HIV/AIDS, he is reported to have posed the question in these
terms: ‘Has there been a case in history where a major public health catastrophe was
eﬀectively managed and brought under control by placing individual rights above
collective rights as public interest?’ (Botswana Guardian, 20th June 2003). The
conference, the reporter filed in his report, ‘reacted with palpable ferocity’. In any
event, it was unable to reach a decision and had not even produced a draft report by
August. There was talk of the need for more workshops.
In the autumn of that year, things were to change through the decisive action of
Botswana’s President as well as the ability of those in charge of Botswana’s ARV
programme to critically revise and rethink their approach to the pandemic in the light
of their experience.
Botswana phase three: from voluntarism to enforcement?
Let me start with the President’s story. In June 2003, President Festus Mogae fell ill
and feared that he too might have contracted the disease. He took a test and publicly
announced this fact. It was negative. Nevertheless, he became the first African
President to openly admit such a fear. And, it was clearly a salutary experience for,
in a dramatic turnaround in November he backed a full testing programme,
recommending that it become routine (with an opt-out clause) in all government
facilities. In his view, until testing became universal and accepted, there was little hope
of breaking the circle of denial and infection. As he was all too aware, the time is
already late, ‘our cemeteries are filled with the headstones of people in their 20s and
30s’ (speech in Washington, 12th November 2003). Thus, from 1st January 2004,
routine testing was to occur in hospitals and conceivably throughout public sector
health provision. This was a dramatic change in policy, from a carefully monitored
ARV programme, a roll-out in specified sites, to a generalized one of testing. The
mother and child clinics in the larger rural villages had no testing facilities of any kind
when visited six months earlier.
This raises again the thorny issue of transmission. As mentioned previously, the
hopes of preventing transmission rested on encouraging large numbers to come
forward for testing, hopefully before they were infected, so they would have an
incentive to remain that way. There was no sign of that being the case during our visit
to the villages. And, even by April 2004, Ernest Darkoh, Operations Manager of the
Programme, admitted that most people still did not know their HIV status. He
estimated it as less than 10% and many of these were still presenting at a very late
stage of the disease (Darkoh, 2004). This alone threatened to overwhelm the provision
in place. But, if ‘Know Your Status’ has become the new campaigning slogan, it
remains unclear what advice is being given to those that test positive. Given that
therapy does not commence until an individual’s CD4 count falls to 200 or less, there
is a long window, approximately eight years, where an individual can transmit the
infection. As Darkoh is reported to have said ‘therapy is a waste of time if you are
not stopping new infections. It’s like trying to mop a floor without turning oﬀ the tap’
(Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, Tuesday May 11th, 2004).
As has been shown, Western-based knowledge did not dispel indigenous belief nor
the possibility of treatment dispel fear. Much of the failure of the programme has
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been put down to stigma. Would it not be better now – to escape the universalities
implied in such designation – to call this ‘shame’? There is no doubt that it has been
a strong feature of the Tswana situation and we need to ask: How far does it relate
to the association of HIV with taboo and pollution? But here, we are in a hall of
mirrors and it is important to ask how far the ‘special’ status of HIV, imported from
the West, with its association with ‘perverted sexuality’ and mandatory emphasis on
confidentiality has not coalesced with indigenous ideas to magnify the negative aura
surrounding the disease? This, interestingly, is now the line taken by those in charge
of the HIV/AIDS programmes in Botswana. For example Dr Banu Khan, the
National AIDS co-ordinator, blames international guidelines for creating the problem
by the way it created AIDS as a distinct kind of disease, which alone had to be dealt
with strict confidentiality (BBC News, 2004a).
Which brings me back to the consensus. What can be said and thought and what
cannot rests on the acceptance of often unexamined precepts and normative practices.
I have not tried to trace the interlocked interests and institutions that hold the
discourse together, making it impermeable, a closed system. What I have been
concerned to do is to emphasize its strength, its hold, the way it can continue to
promote a particular set of principles and practices, in the name of morality and good
practice, in the face of limited or even no success, and of a massive toll on human
life. Trying to talk outside or against this consensus is treated as heresy and meets
inevitable opposition – even when led by the President. One is left with an impression
of a very lonely President Mogae, hitting out in all directions, as his policy for routine
testing is castigated by human rights organizations, both in his own country and the
West, as smacking of ‘forced testing [which] violates the public’s human rights and
rights to privacy’ (Mmegi, 2004). Visibly irritated, the newspaper Mmegi reports,
Mogae said that because of this they had to prescribe an elaborate rigmarole for
oﬀering routine testing, which is dramatically slowing down the programme.
Meanwhile his people are not only dying – they are facing extinction.
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